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Resumo
Efi ciência do Poder Aéreo em Apoio da Política 
Nacional
Desde os primórdios do voo tripulado que os teó-
ricos do poder aéreo debatem a sua efi cácia. Este 
estudo considera o poder aéreo na sua defi nição 
ampla, abordando a sua contribuição total no 
sentido de infl uenciar o comportamento político 
do adversário, contribuindo dessa forma para a 
consecução dos objectivos políticos nacionais. Este 
artigo argumenta que a efi cácia do poder aéreo em 
apoio dos objectivos políticos nacionais, se bem 
que fortemente contextualizada, tem aumentado 
signifi cativamente desde 1945. Esta constatação 
baseia-se no estudo de factores comuns que têm 
infl uenciado a efi cácia do poder aéreo. Este estudo 
irá articular alguns desses factores considerando 
uma trindade de objectivos, estratégia adversária, 
e estratégia do poder aéreo. Conclui que o poder 
aéreo, para ser efi caz, não necessita de ganhar as 
guerras de forma isolada. Basta apenas que for-
neça opções fl exíveis, que possam ser utilizadas 
pelos decisores políticos, sempre que desejem 
utilizar a força para coagir uma mudança com-
portamental do adversário.
Abstract
Since the dawn of manned fl ight, airpower theorists 
have debated its effectiveness. This study will consider 
airpower in its broad sense, addressing the “total” 
airpower contribution to infl uence adversary’s political 
behavior, thus supporting the achievement of the 
national policy objectives. Although highly situational 
and with controversial narratives, this essay will argue 
that airpower’s effectiveness in support of national 
policy has signifi cantly improved since 1945. Moreover, 
the study of airpower unveils certain commonalities 
which have affected its effectiveness. This essay will 
highlight some of these factors in a trinity which 
considers the scope of objectives, adversary’s strategy, 
and airpower’s strategy. It concludes that to be effective, 
airpower does not need to win wars singlehandedly. 
It only needs to provide fl exible options to be used 
by the decision makers when willing to use force to 
compel a change of adversary’s behavior.
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Airpower’s Effectiveness in Support of National Policy
Since the dawn of manned fl ight, airpower theorists have debated its effectiveness. 
Throughout history, extreme claims about airpower decisiveness to singlehandedly 
win wars have hindered the conceptual and real application of this valuable 
instrument of power.
Although highly situational and with controversial narratives, airpower’s 
effectiveness in support of national policy has signifi cantly improved since 1945. 
Moreover, the study of airpower unveils certain commonalities which have affected 
its effectiveness. This essay will highlight some of these factors in a trinity which 
considers the scope of objectives, adversary’s strategy, and airpower’s strategy. The 
discussion will start by establishing a framework to evaluate airpower’s effectiveness 
while addressing some methodological concerns. Then it will provide some evidence 
which supports the argument.
First, some assumptions are in order. Clausewitz has advised us that war is a 
continuation of politics.1 However, if we think about its complexity and consequences, 
war should be the last resort of policy, and sometimes even a failure of politics. 
It is always diffi cult to wage and its effects cannot be scientifi cally predicted. 
Therefore, from the political perspective, war, especially the ones fought for less 
than vital interests, will always have severe constraints which will limit airpower’s 
effectiveness.2 Second, some factors hinder this analysis. It’s diffi cult to fi nd a 
consensus about the political objectives of each operation which impacts airpower’s 
employment and assessment. Moreover, measuring effectiveness is a daunting task. 
It becomes particularly diffi cult when trying to assess, in an isolated manner, the 
impact of a single element of power to the overall objectives of a confl ict. Finally, 
the literature surveyed offers different interpretations about airpower’s effectiveness, 
sometimes biased, depending on the authors’ agendas, background, and knowledge.3 
Nonetheless, history may not tell us exactly what to do in the future; however it 
can teach us how to ask the right questions.
Therefore, in order to minimize such limitations, this study will consider airpower 
in its broad sense, including both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities.4 Moreover, 
1 Clauzewitz, On War, 23.
 2 Those political constraints infl uence airpower’s strategy and effectiveness, and may include restricted 
targets, casualty avoidance, confl ict duration, forces to be employed, area of operations, etc.
 3 The competing narratives about airpower’s employment and results allow almost the support 
of any kind of argument. However, there is a bright side to this issue. It prevents, or at least 
severely diminishes the academic value of the extreme claims about airpower as a war winner. 
In the author’s opinion this extreme vision of airpower is long overdue and it has detracted 
from the optimal understanding and employment of airpower in support of national policy.
 4 Kinetic capabilities such as defense and attack roles, as well as non-kinetic elements, such as 
transport, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, or medical evacuation.
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the discussion is not about airpower’s decisiveness but rather its effectiveness. 
While the former debates the ability to singlehandedly win a war and refl ects the 
controversial narratives between air and ground power, the latter expresses how 
airpower has contributed to the achievement of national objectives. Since airpower 
can only be understood as a continuation of policy, effectiveness is here defi ned as 
the “total” airpower contribution to infl uence adversary’s political behavior, thus 
supporting the achievement of the national policy objectives.5 Hence, using this 
methodology, this study will now assess some commonalities which have impacted 
airpower’s effectiveness.
Airpower has been most effective when employed to fulfi ll limited objectives. 
In a limited war, both restrained and with scarce capabilities, it is extremely important 
to have specifi c, limited, and achievable objectives.6 Desert Storm had easily defi ned 
objectives and force was used in a decisive and overwhelming manner, with minimal 
restrictions.7 In contrast, in Vietnam the political objectives varied throughout the war
and directly affected airpower’s effectiveness. The initial political objective were to
ensure “an independent, stable, non-Communist South Vietnam.”8 On the other hand,
the willingness to prevent a Third World War and to focus the domestic and international
opinion away from Vietnam restrained the use of airpower, making it politically 
ineffective.9 The latter political objective had a more limited scope, and aimed to withdraw
American troops without leaving South Vietnam to an imminent Communist takeover.10 
Additionally, concurrently diplomatic efforts reduced the threat of confl ict expansion 
which allowed the bombing campaign to threaten North Vietnam’s vital interests. 
These efforts combined with a change of adversary’s strategy, employing forces within 
a conventional warfare framework, allowed airpower to be more effective.
In the case of Operation Allied Force, political objectives overestimated the 
capabilities of airpower to coerce Milosevic.11 Moreover, the political imperative 
 5 Using Mark Clodfelter framework, airpower’s effectiveness must be measured in terms of its 
contribution to achieving the desired political objectives. Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 
215. Also Richard Davis supports this framework. Davis, On Target, 285.
 6 The meaning of limited war (as opposed to total war) refers to the restricted nature of confl ict, 
both in national interests, capabilities employed, and scope of political constraints to the use 
of force.
 7 The political objectives for Desert Storm were to force the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, to 
restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, to ensure security and stability of Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf, 
and to protect US lives. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 22.
 8 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 204.
 9 Ibid., 204, 209.
10 Ibid., 204.
11 The political objectives for Allied Force were threefold. First, demonstrate the seriousness 
of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for peace. Second, stop Milosovic from
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for not employing ground troops and the requirement to maintain the integrity 
of the coalition imposed a less than desirable air strategy. Nonetheless, after 
78 days of air bombing Milosevic acceded to NATO demands.12 Although the 
campaign succeeded in accomplishing this objective, it failed to stop the ethnic 
cleansing and didn’t severely damage Milosevic’s armed forces.13 The political 
constrains such as minimal casualties, target selection, coalition integrity, financial 
cost of war, reconstruction efforts, etc, hindered the rapid and overwhelming 
application of airpower. However, such constrains are part of the limited use 
of force in the last decades. They are most noticeable in campaigns where there 
are no vital interests at stake, such as humanitarian interventions, and are highly 
influenced by the impact of global media in domestic and international audiences. 
Nonetheless, Allied Force demonstrated the utility of airpower in facilitating the 
employment of ground forces without the required attrition to fight to conquer 
the territory.14 For the risk-averse modern societies, this is by itself a strategic 
success of airpower.
Likewise, current operations have similar limitations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), the political objective of creating a stable, democratic Iraq fi nds parallel with 
Vietnam regarding its broadness.15 In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the political 
constraints that limit airpower application in Pakistan also hinder the accomplishment 
of the initial objectives to capture Bin Laden and eliminate Al Qaida.16
The previous examples exposed the wide spectrum of objectives, sometimes not 
achievable by military power alone, refl ecting the political expectations for a swift 
use of airpower. However, considering that war is a duel, the adversary (i.e. its 
nature, environment, and strategy) always has an important role to play.
 continuing attacking civilians. And third, if necessary, damage Serbia’s capacity to wage future 
war on Kosovo. Wrage, Immaculate Warfare, 7. One explanation for Milosevic capitulation argues 
that “the combination of NATO airpower and threat of ground invasion confronted Serbia with 
certain defeat.” Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 84. Others offer additional reasons such as the 
restiveness of Milosovic’s populace, or his abandonment by his patrons, the Russians. Wrage, 
Immaculate Warfare, viii.
12 Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 68.
13 Wrage, Immaculate Warfare, 65.
14 Ibid., 8.
15 Political objectives in OIF were initially to remove Saddam from power to eliminate his capacity 
to support terrorism and develop weapons of mass destruction; maintain international support 
for US actions in particular from the Islamic world. After the regime change, create the conditions 
for a democratic government while maintaining maximum international support for US action. 
Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 221.
16 Political objectives for OEF were (1) destroy Al Qaeda including denying sanctuary for terrorists 
attacks, (2) retribution for the 9/11 attacks, (3) preventing future terrorism, (4) maintaining 
maximum international support for US actions in particular from the Islamic world. Ibid., 221.
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Airpower’s effectiveness is maximized against adversaries that fi ght in 
conventional ways, yet it plays an essential role in counterinsurgency confl icts. 
When confronting adversaries who are dependent on complex command and 
control systems and employ large conventional forces, airpower provides an 
overwhelming leverage. Additionally, the need for logistic support and movement 
increases the opportunities for kinetic engagements. However, if the adversary 
employs decentralized insurgent forces and fi ghts in complex environments such 
as mountains, jungle, or urban centers, then airpower’s effectiveness is reduced.
The experience in Vietnam has demonstrated that fi ghting guerrilla forces that 
use irregular warfare tactics hindered airpower’s effectiveness. When Hanoi engaged 
in conventional methods (exposing troops in the fi eld, increasing the need for 
logistical supply, and use of lines of communication to maneuver,) and airpower 
was widely employed using precision guided munitions and accurate intelligence, 
airpower’s effectiveness improved.17 Therefore, the changing nature of the confl ict 
produced a positive impact on airpower’s effectiveness, eventually compelling the 
adversary to an agreement.
Such lessons can be found in current confl icts, but this time in a reverse order. 
In OEF, defeating the Taliban didn’t equate to eliminating Al Qaeda. Initially the 
Taliban engaged the coalition forces in a conventional way, and they were rapidly 
disbanded. However, once the insurgents used the complex environment and 
initiated the insurgency they were able to increase the “fog and friction” of war, 
thus reducing airpower’s effectiveness.18 Although using unprecedented space, 
surveillance, and information systems, OEF revealed, again, that being successful 
in unconventional environments requires accurate and timely intelligence, in 
particular human intelligence.19 Again in OIF, during the conventional phase of 
17 Ibid., 206.
18 Clausewitz addresses “fog of war” as a fundamental attribute which exposes battlespace’s 
uncertainty regarding the knowledge about the adversary, the environment, and even friendly 
forces. Friction differentiates “war in paper” from reality. It includes several variables that will 
impact the execution of the plan, from topography, meteorological conditions, fear, confusion, etc. 
Clausewitz, On War, 77-83. Those factors were ultimately expressed in the failure of Operation 
Anaconda, considering the coalition casualties and the shortfalls in battlespace awareness 
and command and control. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 97. Technology, in particular the 
connection of sensors and shooters in a network centric environment, may contribute to the 
decrease of “fog and friction” but the immutable nature of war prevents complete certainty.
19 The fact that most of the insurgents escaped to Pakistan, and that Bin Laden was not captured 
exposes some of the shortfalls of OEF. Besides proper intelligence, this can be also attributed 
to the limitations of the “Afghan Model” which relied too much in indigenous forces, which 
sometimes don’t have the interest, the skill, or determination to accomplish essential tasks. 
Andres, Wills, and Griffi th, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” 
152.
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the confl ict, airpower was critical to control the airspace and stop and annihilate 
Iraqi troops, allowing freedom of action of coalition forces and reducing casualties. 
Once the confl ict shifted its nature to an insurgency, then airpower has seen its 
effectiveness decrease.20
Within the context of the Global War on Terrorism, airpower’s effectiveness can 
be limited. It has a successful record when employed against a state which sponsors 
terrorism, imposing costs that range from destruction of high value infrastructures, 
like in the case of Libya, to regime change, like in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 
when it comes to counterinsurgency operations, the kinetic aspect loses preeminence. 
The desire to “win hearts and minds” poses additional constraints on airpower, in 
particular regarding the level of force employed and the undesired effects which can 
be manipulated through an adversary skillful strategic communications campaign.21 
However, assessment of airpower’s effectiveness depends on the metrics and thought 
process. Using measures of performance which consider only the lethal and kinetic 
application of airpower can be deceiving. Moreover, airpower in its broadest sense 
goes beyond destroying infrastructure and killing people. Its effectiveness in a 
counterinsurgent context can still be achieved in essential roles such as theatre 
mobility, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,) information operations, 
medical evacuation, humanitarian relief, support to host nation forces, and if needed 
precision targeting in support of ground forces.22 Within this context, overreliance 
on the kinetic aspects and on single airpower solutions to confl icts has proven to 
be a path for limited effectiveness of airpower.
Bombing for effects, not destruction, leverages airpower’s effectiveness. 
The massive bombing campaign during Vietnam looked pale in comparison to 
the accuracy, effects, and politic utility of airpower in the 1991 Gulf War. The 
traditional carpet bombing strategy gave way to discriminate targeting. Desert Storm 
established the historical turning point regarding airpower’s effectiveness, where 
the synthesis of new technology and strategy allowed the shift from destructing 
20 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 222.
21 The term “heart and minds” expresses the fundamental challenge of irregular warfare. In 
traditional warfare “the objective may be to convince or coerce key military or political decision 
makers, defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or 
seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.” 
In irregular warfare the struggle shifts the emphasis to obtain “legitimacy and infl uence over 
the relevant populations.” AFDD 2-3, 2.
22 The extensive study of small wars has provided precious lessons about the effectiveness of the 
so called “support roles of airpower.” This study states that when fi ghting insurgency, “the 
indirect application of airpower, that is, the support role of aviation, often proves the most 
important contribution.” Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 427. The same lessons 
are being re-learned in OEF and OIF.
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entire target systems to targeting key nodes.23 It represented the effort to apply 
airpower in a comprehensive and unitary way to achieve strategic results.24 
Merging stealth, precision guided munitions, bombing for effect (not destruction), 
and improvements in the command and control established the seeds that forever 
transformed airpower’s political utility.25 However, several defi ciencies in Battle 
Damage Assessment and understanding the relationships between bombing and 
outcome hampered the analysis of air operations.26 Moreover, lack of intelligence 
hindered the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear program and contributed also to 
the military failure of the anti-Scud effort. Nonetheless, the air effort towards 
destroying Scuds was politically justifi ed to guarantee the neutrality of Israel.27 
The application of a new strategy, based on effects, made increasingly effi cient by 
new technology, supported the political objectives for the campaign and shaped 
airpower’s future strategy.
OEF is another example of airpower strategy’s adaptation in support of national 
policy. This time, precision airpower was directed by Special Forces to support 
indigenous and small groups of coalition forces and destroy Taliban’s fi elded 
forces, transforming the nature of conventional war in Afghanistan.28 The use of 
legacy platforms, such as the B-52, performing responsive Close Air Support (CAS) 
missions reveals the conceptual adaptation and innovation, which contrasts the 
rigid doctrines of the past regarding strategic and tactical forces.29 This “airpower 
buffet” which provided around the clock interdiction and responsive CAS, helped 
achieve victory by overcoming political and geographical obstacles to using force 
in such a remote and inaccessible environment.30
In OIF, effect based operations were again pursued but still suffered from a lack 
of ability to measure and forecast effects.31 However, as in Desert Storm, this concept 
23 Davis, On Target, 317.
24 Reynolds, Heart of the Storm, xi.
25 The air strategy, based upon Instant Thunder framework developed by John Warden, employed 
parallel and simultaneous attacks to shock and paralyze the adversary. Based on Warden’s Five 
Ring Model and viewing the adversary as a system of systems, allowed airpower to affect key 
nodes and cause the disruption of the entire system.
26 Davis, On Target, 285.
27 Ibid., 299.
28 Andres, Wills, and Griffi th, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” 
134.
29 During the Cold War, strategic command (i.e. bombers) had the preponderance of assets, 
leadership positions, and doctrinal control. The notion that if airpower was able to fi ght a 
nuclear confl ict then it would be able to fi ght any war has detracted from learning the right 
lessons from the confl icts during the Cold War period.
30 Ibid., 144.
31 Johnson, Learning Large Lessons, 126.
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revealed the potential to understand and attack the adversary from a systemic 
perspective, thus applying airpower in a more effi cient way than past traditional 
targeting. Furthermore, it considerably lowered war casualties and destruction, 
facilitating follow on reconstruction, and above all contributed to diminishing the 
historic images of airpower’s inhumanity.
From a conceptual perspective, the current wars have demonstrated the 
importance of shifting the emphasis of airpower to non-kinetic roles in order to 
obtain additional leverage. However, history has shown that there is no simple 
strategy that applies to all confl icts. Therefore, airpower strategists should not 
be constrained by theoretical dogmas, such as the quest for strategic decisiveness 
which has guided most of airpower’s history. Considering airpower in its broadest 
sense, kinetic and non-kinetic, lethal and non-lethal, shows that those available tools 
should be mixed and matched, providing a “cocktail” which can better support 
the national objectives. In this respect, airpower’s strategy and effectiveness will 
always be situational.
In conclusion, to be effective, airpower does not need to win wars singlehandedly. 
It only needs to provide fl exible options to be used by the decision makers when 
willing to use force to compel a change of adversary’s behavior. Therefore, this 
essay has shown that airpower’s effectiveness should be assessed against its 
ability to support the political objectives. Within this framework, it argued that 
such effectiveness has signifi cantly improved since 1945. To support this claim a 
framework of limited objectives, adversary strategy, and airpower strategy was 
used, highlighting the contextual nature of airpower’s strategic utility. If one could 
provide a single example that synthesizes airpower’s effectiveness as a result of 
the convergence of these governing factors probably the most compelling would 
be the raid against Libya in 1986. It had limited objectives, was employed against 
a conventional adversary, targeted key nodes of its system, and was integrated 
with other instruments of national power.32 In the end airpower was fully effective 
in supporting the achievement of the political objectives. Although it was a single 
32 The political objectives for the raid against Libya were: punish Qaddafi  for the West Berlin 
attack, to disrupt Libyan terrorist operations, and to dissuade Qaddafi  from supporting terrorism. 
This operation contributed to change Qaddafi ’s behavior and provided deterrence to other state 
sponsors of terrorism. Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, ix. Some of the political constraints involved the 
minimum risk for US forces, reduced Libyan collateral damage, while imposing a devastating 
impact on Qaddafi . Ibid., 151. This mission showed that decisive application of airpower in 
conjunction with economic and diplomatic measures can infl uence and facilitate the attainment 
of foreign policy objectives. Ibid., 202. The lessons learned from this mission were applied in 
large scale 5 years later in Desert Storm.
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operation, it demonstrates the value of airpower as a coercive tool. However, 
legitimate political constraints combined with airpower’s limitations and “fog and 
friction” always deny a simple solution to war.
The evidence presented throughout this essay reveals a conceptual evolution in 
airpower application, combining legacy platforms with state of the art space and 
informational systems melded by innovative effect based strategies. Hence, airpower’s 
effectiveness has been maximized against adversaries who fi ght conventional 
wars, such as the case of both Gulf Wars. Additionally, the majority of examples 
expose airpower’s growing effectiveness supporting selective strategic objectives. 
However, all the cases studied indicate that without an integration of efforts it is not 
possible to produce a long lasting solution. Although Allied Force, OEF, and OIF 
demonstrated brilliance from an operational perspective, thus supporting national 
policy, they were not able to produce long-term strategic effects which allowed 
a better peace.33 However, this supreme objective goes well beyond the scope of 
military instruments of power and requires a holistic approach to war. Such is the 
conundrum that faces modern use of force.
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